This paper carries out an investigation into the socio economic determinants of childbearing decisions made by couples in Italy. The analysis accounts for the characteristics of both possible parents. Our results do not support established theoretical predictions according to which the increase in the opportunity cost of motherhood connected to higher female labour participation is responsible for the fall in fertility. On the contrary, the instability of women's work status (i.e. having occasional, precarious, and low paid positions) is revealed as a significant dissuasive factor in the decision to have children. Couples in which there is an unemployed woman are less likely to plan childbearing as well. Other relevant explanatory variables are women's age, men's work status and education, women's citizenship, marital status and perceived economic well being.
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Sometime in the next few years (if it hasn't happened already) the world will reach a milestone: half of the population will bear only enough children to replace itself. That is, the fertility rate of half of the world's countries will be 2.1 or below, resulting in slower population growth, and eventually stabilization. This is not necessarily bad news. According to the United Nations Population Division (2009), fast population growth, fuelled by high fertility, hinders the reduction of poverty and the achievement of other development goals. However, in countries experiencing a dramatic ageing of the population, such as Italy, the drop in the fertility rate brings about some worrisome side effects.
First, low fertility substantially reduces the size of the labour force. Second, the decline in the workforce puts the actuarial sustainability of the current pension system at risk. Furthermore, with very low fertility, the reduction of the labour supply is most severe for younger workers. Young workers are the main assimilators of new technology, and countries that have a shortage of young skilled workers are more vulnerable to competition (McDonald 2008; McDonald and Temple 2006) .
Theory commonly relates the fall in fertility to the rise of female participation in the labour market (Willis 1973; Becker 1981; Cigno 1991) . In the 70s, consistent with this theory, the higher level of education achieved, and the related prospects for better work positions and higher earnings, raised the opportunity cost of not working, thereby causing a postponement of childbearing decisions, which in turn led to a fall in fertility rates (Adsera 2004; D'Addio and D'Ercole 2005) . However, the relationship between female participation in the workforce and fertility has changed significantly over the last two decades. In the EU, the sign of the cross country correlation has now become positive (Ahn and Mira 2002; Morgan 2003; Engelhardt et al. 2004; Billari and Kohler 2004 ; for an alternative view see Kögel 2004) . Still, the shift does not concern Italy, which, despite having one of the lowest female participation rates in Europe, still suffers from a markedly lower level of fertility. The Italian exception has been explained as the result of institutional and policy differences in comparison with Nordic countries where more generous protection systems have been implemented to reconcile motherhood with work (Bernhardt 1993; Gauthier 1996; Adsera 2004; Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2004; Del Boca and Sauer 2009 ).
The empirical literature investigating the fall in fertility focuses almost only on women's economic conditions and on actual fertility rates, somewhat neglecting the fact that: 1) in EU countries, the desired fertility rate is significantly higher than the actual rate (Eurostat 2001; Adsera 2006) . 2)
Family planning decisions are in most cases -as the term suggests -a family matter or, more specifically, a "couple matter".
Here we argue that, in addition to female participation on the one hand, and the pressure of the "biological clock" and of social and cultural factors on the other, one of the main issues a woman considers when deciding whether to have a child is: can -i.e. my partner and I -afford it?
Thus, rather than only analyzing the labour market participation of women -which has already been fruitfully addressed by a series of previous studies -we aim to add new insights to the debate by focusing on the "economic sustainability" of childbearing decisions at the family level. This choice is also related to the fact that, in most cases, childbearing is conceived in the context of a steady relationship. In Italy, single women and men desiring children are in fact still quite rare and, in some cases, even thwarted by law.
The empirical studies tracing the differences between Northern and Southern Europe to the institutional framework of female participation reasonably account for social policies related to childcare assistance, parental leave arrangements, and the availability of part time positions for women. Besides few exceptions (see for example Adsera 2004), the stability of the aspiring parents'
work status or, in other words, their "labour precariousness", has so far been neglected. It is worth noting that the concept of labour precariousness is in general disregarded by the conventional literature, which considers it more as an obvious and somewhat desirable side effect of flexibility rather than as a crucial factor related to workers' well being. This view can be hardly generalized to Italy, where precarious workers are characterized by low income levels, inadequate social protection and discontinuous careers.In this paper, together with a series of conventional socio economic factors already considered by previous studies, we test the role of new labour market related variables which may influence the economic sustainability of the decision to have children.
In particular, we focus on the of the work status. The main hypothesis we want to test here is that having a precarious job (i.e. unstable, low paid, and with scarce guarantees) is a deterrent to planning parenthood rather than a persuasive factor to childbearing through a decrease in the opportunity cost for women. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we offer a synthetic background on Italy. In Section 3 we describe our hypotheses. In Sections 4 and 5 we describe data and methodology. In Section 6 we present and discuss our results. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the analysis.
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The relationship between education, labour market participation, and fertility has changed over time. Since the 1960s, the fertility rate has sharply decreased in most developed countries in correspondence with an increase in female labour participation rates. The world average total fertility rate fell from 2.9 in 1960 to 2.04 in 1975 and then to 1.6 in the late 1990s. Female labour force participation rates climbed to almost 48% in 1975, up from 41% in 1960 and dramatically increased to 64% by the late 1990s (Adsera 2004) . From the second half of the 90s, the participation of women in the labour market continued to increase in all countries, but fertility rates started to decline at a slower rate or, in some cases, began to grow again. However, relevant differences can be observed across countries. In the European Union, the countries with the lowest fertility (Spain, Italy, and Greece) are those with relatively low levels of female labour force participation, while the countries with higher fertility rates (Denmark, France, and Sweden) show a relatively high female participation in the labour market. Italy, especially in the northern and central regions, became the title holder of the so called "lowest low" fertility (Kohler et al. 2002; Castiglioni and Della Zuanna 2009 Still, the Italian TFR remains one of the lowest in developed countries. According to the UN estimates, in a constant fertility scenario, only Germany and Japan will perform worse than Italian women continue to show a strong desire for motherhood even after the first childbirth. Still, the second childbirth has become an even more rare event. It thus seems that the decrease in fertility cannot be attributed to a negative attitude towards procreation (Istat 2007, p. 2) . This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that, according to Istat's Survey on Births (2007), the desired fertility rate is significantly higher than the actual one. This suggests that further investigation is required in order to understand the determinants of this gap or, in other words, what curbs the couples' ambition to conceive a second child.
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The main aim of the paper is to analyze the socio economic determinants of a couple's intention to have children in Italy. Our study differentiates itself from the existing literature by: 1) assessing the role of the precariousness of women's employment; 2) focusing on childbearing , instead of accounting solely for actual fertility, in order to better evaluate the determinants of the to have (more) children; 3) assessing at the micro level the possible role of a series of economic features of the components of the couple, instead of focusing on women only.
We argue that if the aspiring mother holds a precarious position in the labour market e.g. she has an unstable, low paid, and insecure job -the couple will be less likely to have the time and the material resources for expanding their family. In its "Classification of Status in Employment", the International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines "precarious" workers as either: (a) workers whose contract of employment leads to the classification of the incumbent as belonging to the groups of "casual workers" 1 ; (b) "short term workers" or "seasonal workers"; or (c) workers whose contract of employment will allow the employing enterprise or person to terminate the contract at short notice. As stated in the introduction, the concept of labour precariousness is generally disregarded by the conventional literature, which considers it more as a side effect of flexibility rather than as a crucial, potentially negative, factor related to workers' well being. This view can be hardly generalized to Italy, where the reform of the labour market implemented in the mid '90s introduced new forms of temporary labour contracts (those used for the so called and ). These workers are characterized by low income levels, inadequate social protection and discontinuous careers (Cipollone 2001). The Italian social protection system is inadequate "to cope with the greater individual insecurity associated with a more flexible labour market", because of "the lack of wage subsidies for the low paid, and the poor coverage of the unemployment benefits" (Brandolini et al. 2007; p. 63 and 59) . This inadequacy leads to an increase in the probability of being poor for households with non standard workers: Bank of Italy (2009) Negative effects associated with precarious jobs are more pronounced when temporary contracts are used as replacements for (or alternatives to) permanent ones, with the consequence being that precarious becomes a long term status. Young people and women are more exposed to this risk (Brandolini et al. 2007; Barbieri and Scherer 2005) . There are a number of reasons to expect workers to remain "trapped" in precariousness. First, due to the lack of training, the extreme flexibility (both in terms of time and mobility), and the worsening in health conditions generally 1 The ILO defines "casual" workers as having an explicit or implicit contract of employment which is not expected to continue for more than a short period. 2 Most are similar to fixed term employees except that they are paid less and receive lower social security contributions, and do not benefit from employment protection legislation (Brandolini et al 2007) .
are individuals who work through a temporary employment agency. 3 Labour precariousness can thus be seen as a barrier to social integration that may destroy human and social capital: a high level of employment flexibility hinders training and qualification and, at the same time, hampers the consolidation of social ties, both inside and outside the workplace. associated with precarious positions, workers may find it very difficult to upgrade their skills and develop new contacts (Benach et al. 2000; Virtanen 2002; Guadalupe 2003; Menendez et al. 2006; Kim et al. 2008; Amudeo Dorantes et al. 2010) . The progressive erosion of the individual stock of human and social capital may gradually worsen the chances of making the transition into stable employment (Sabatini, 2009) . Moreover, as argued by Barbieri and Scherer (2009) , there might be a stigma associated with precarious or "b series", jobs: "not having been selected for the primary labour market is interpreted as a negative signal by potential future employers" (p. 678). After a certain period of instability, individuals in precarious jobs concretely face the risk of exclusion from the labour market (Booth et al. 2002; Dolado et al. 2002; D'Addio and Rosholm 2005) . The passage from an unstable to a stable position thus is not an easy task that can be fulfilled simply by deciding to do it. This is why we argue that precariousness, as we define it in this paper, can be hardly considered as the result of a spontaneous choice. In Italy, precarious employment is such a disadvantageous condition that just very few women would deliberately prefer it for the seek of a more interesting and stimulating job.
Since the high exposure to the risks of job loss, wage variability, and intermittent unemployment raise the uncertainty of future income (making any form of long term life planning such as marriage and procreation difficult), we expect a negative association between the employment precariousness couple. After matching household heads' and partners' characteristics we have a sub sample of 1,696 couples 5 .
Our dependent variable is the dummy "intention to have (more) children": 15% of the couples report they want children. The main independent variables are dummies representing the work status of men and women. In particular, we account for the condition of being unemployed, not employed, a precarious employee, a stable employee, and self employed. As pointed out in Section 3, we define precarious as holding an unstable position: employees with fixed term contracts or atypical workers. Stable employees are those with an open ended contract.
We controlled for women's age, male and female level of education, the perceived economic well being of the couple 6 , the geographical area of residence, marital status, number of children in the family, presence of grandparents, and citizenship. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3 . All variables are described in detail in Table A1 in the Appendix. The average ages are 41 and 37 for men and women respectively. 47% (41%) of males (females) reported low education, and 42%
(46%) completed high school. The large majority of men (67%) are employed with a stable job (open ended contract), 21% are self employed and 6% are precarious. The percentage of women who are employed with a stable job is 41%, while 37% are out of the labour force (mainly housewives); the percentage of those unemployed and employed with a precarious job are 6% and 7% respectively. The average number of children is 1.5; 21% (63%) of the couples answer that their household's income is not sufficient (only just sufficient) to satisfy their needs. 
where is the set of independent variables aimed to explain fertility choices (described in section 4). When has a standard logistic distribution we can derive the logit model:
Least squares estimation of (2) may lead to biased estimates of the parameters because of the endogeneity of women's occupational status, and in particular the status of being precarious, which is the main point of the paper. In Section 3 we outline how precarious employment can be hardly seen as the result of a worker's deliberate choice. It seems much more reasonable to consider it as a situation of disadvantage to which workers have to adapt only if there are no alternatives.
In order to make the analysis more robust, we perform a regression based test to check whether women's employment instability is endogenous. We follow a two step procedure:
1. first we estimate the female labour force participation equation (probit) ." / Table 4 reports the results of our estimates. Women's unemployment and precarious employment are found to strongly affect childbearing intentions. With respect to couples with permanently employed women (which is the reference category), having a precarious job decreases the probability of planning to have a child by 3% (see column 2 of Table 4 Couples in which the man has a bachelor's degree (and beyond) are more likely to want (more)
children. This association may be due to the better economic conditions probably related to higher levels of education. Another possible explanation may be related to the division of domestic labour, 8 Our calculation is on the basis of data collected from Istat, Ebitemp and Inps.
which is likely to be more equal in couples where men are better educated. The share of domestic work performed by formally employed women forms in fact a critical piece of current cross national explanations for low fertility (Miller Torr and Shorr 2004) . According to McDonald (2000) , the decline in fertility in high income countries is the outcome of a conflict or inconsistency between high levels of gender equity in education and labour market, and low levels of gender equity in the family and family oriented institutions. This phenomenon has been observed in a pioneer empirical study by Hochschild (1989) , who found that in the U.S., while female participation in the labour market dramatically increased over the last decades, a much less dramatic change occurred within domestic life: women are more likely to share the paid work, but men are often not much more likely to share the domestic work and childcare. The resulting "extra burden"
for women can be used to explain lower fertility in advanced economies (Chesnais 1996 , Matthews 1999 McDonald 2000; Miller Torr and Shorr 2004, Cooke 2009) . As an interpretation of our findings, we argue that men's education may play a significant role in changing the division of domestic labour towards a higher level of gender equity. In our view, this argument is strictly related to the previous one. Not only may the job displacement related to childbearing destroy all a woman's specific human capital, as outlined above, it also reduces the rate at which human capital is accumulated in the future (Del Bono et al. 2008) . Women perceiving the better education of men as a source of gender equity may be more confident they will find time to accumulate new specific human capital after a childbirth. Such a perspective may soften the fear of facing a career crash as a consequence of motherhood.
As regards men's occupational status, couples in which the man is self employed show a higher probability of planning childbearing with respect to those where men are employed with open ended contracts. Male job instability seems to have no effect on the intention to have children. Self employed men in our sample are mainly professionals and entrepreneurs, i.e., men holding a high socio economic status. Such a condition may entail the availability of better resources for raising children. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that strands of the social psychology and sociological literature claim the existence of a positive relationship between men's status and potential fertility, as estimated by copulation frequency, even in modern, developed, societies (Perusse 1993; Kanazawa 2003; Hopcroft 2005 Hopcroft , 2006 Hopcroft and Whitmeyer 2010) . Using pooled data from the U.S. General Social Survey from the period 1989 2000, Hopcroft (2006) finds that, for men, status and income increase both potential and achieved fertility by promoting the frequency of sex. Even if our data do not detect the sexual habits of the sample (thus we cannot make any inference on "potential fertility"), it could be argued that one of the channels positively affecting the intention to have children may be the possibly higher frequency of sex related to men's status. Overall, our result seems to support the thesis that men do not have to face any trade off between fatherhood and their professional career.
Childbearing intentions increase with the age of the mother, but in a decreasing way (age square has a negative impact). Women that are Italian citizens are less likely to plan to have a child: being Italian decreases the likelihood by 7%. This result is coherent with census data reporting that foreign women, on average, exhibit a one point higher fertility rate and an age at the first childbirth 3.8 years lower than that of Italian women (see Table 2 in Section 2). More in general, the ethnicity based difference in childbearing intentions confirms a well established trend already observed in developed countries (Feld 2000; Coleman 2006 Coleman , 2009 and suggests that further investigations on migrants' fertility patterns are required to better understand Italy's potential to escape the "lowest low fertility trap".
Household characteristics matter as well. Being married increases the likelihood of planning to have a child by 4%. As expected, the number of children, having poor economic conditions and living in the North negatively influence couples' childbearing intentions.
We also tested whether the effect of precarious employment varies across different segments of the population, as grouped on the basis of economic well being and woman's age. Table 5 reports the estimates for the interaction terms between the dummy representing women's unemployment or precariousness 9 , and the dummies for having poor/medium economic conditions and being young (women under 35 years of age). Being on the fringes of the labour market is a significant dissuasive factor against childbearing only for couples with poor/medium economic conditions and for young women. It has no effect on wealthy women and on those aged between 36 46. This result seems to support our hypothesis that one of the main factors influencing the decision to have children is the sustainability of parenthood, both in terms of income and labour market participation. For a relevant part of the population, the sustainability of childbearing is significantly worsened by the precariousness of female employment. After a certain age, the pressure of the "biological clock" seems to become strong enough to possibly counterbalance financial straits. Notes: Coefficients and marginal effects for the probability of desiring a child. The sample includes all couples that answered the question on family planning. Omitted categories are: bachelor's degree and beyond, employed with stable job, good economic well being, and the region of residence South. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. : Coefficients for the probability of desiring a child. The sample includes all couples that answered the question on family planning. Omitted categories are: bachelor's degree and beyond, employed with stable job, good economic well being, and the region of residence South. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Besides confirming the reliability of conventional explanations like civil status, age, and economic well being, the empirical analysis in this paper adds new insights to the debate on the drop in fertility by supporting an alternative explanation of the postponement of childbearing. The instability of female work status is revealed as a significant and strong dissuasive factor against the decision to have children, especially for young couples with medium or low incomes. Conventional theoretical predictions according to which female participation in the labour market may be responsible for the fall in fertility are not supported by data. On the contrary, unemployed and precariously employed women, far from being encouraged to bear children by the lower opportunity cost of leaving the labour market, are definitely less likely to plan to have children.
As outlined in the review of the literature, many authors have properly related the "Italian puzzle", i.e. the combination of low female participation with very low fertility, to differences in the institutional and policy framework. In Nordic countries, where more generous policies on parental arrangements and childcare assistance have been implemented, the negative association between participation and fertility has in fact been reversed. These studies suggest the creation of more part time jobs and the improvement of childcare assistance as possible ways to fill the gap (Del Boca and Sauer 2009, Del Boca et al. 2009 ). Here we argue that public actions aimed at raising fertility should also take into account appropriate labour market policies. In the Italian labour market, flexibility essentially means "precariousness". Precarious workers have low paid jobs, with scarce or nonexistent guarantees in terms of sick leave and parental benefits, career prospects and training opportunities. Everyday life experience widely suggests that one of the decisive questions that employers pose to female candidates in interviews refers to their civil status and childbearing intentions. Temporary female workers are well aware that in most cases a pregnancy would be cause for termination of the work relationship by the employer, possibly causing a collapse in the financial situation of the couple. The resulting trade off may be unsustainable, both in terms of women's life satisfaction and of the economic well being of the couple.
The demographic consequences of this phenomenon are doomed to become more and more important as the share of precarious workers in the labour market constantly grows. The scenario is worsened by the ageing of the population, which weakens the economic system's ability to face global competition and blights the sustainability of the pension system. In such a context, labour market policies alleviating the precariousness of temporary workers would probably lead to more balanced choices in terms of family planning and labour market participation. 
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